Parliament in Winter Session 2009 (Nov 19th - Dec 22nd)

Parliament met for the Winter Session starting 19th November this year. Lok Sabha sat for 21 days and Rajya Sabha for 23. The session saw discussions on several major issues that included sugarcane pricing, climate change, price rise and the Liberhan report. We present some statistics from this recently concluded session.

On 6 out of 21 days, Lok Sabha met for less than 2 hrs Several hours were lost to interruptions. Total productive time in Lok Sabha was 106 hours, 76% of scheduled time. Productive time in Rajya Sabha was 102 hours, 88% of scheduled time. Attendance in the Lok Sabha varied between 56% and 75% with the average for the session at 66%. Rajya Sabha saw an average attendance of 68%. 30th Nov (the Monday following the long weekend) saw the lowest attendance. Issues taken up for discussion on this day included natural calamities in the country and law and order situation in West Bengal. Of 26 Bills planned for passage, only 14 were actually passed Prior to the commencement of each session, the Government publishes a list of business. Among other things, this agenda contains the list of Bills that the Government seeks to pass. However, the number of Bills actually passed is often lower than this plan. The last session saw only 23% of the plan being achieved. For this current Winter Session, the Government had lined up 26 Bills for passage. However, only 14 were actually passed. In 34% cases, the inquiring MP was absent when the question was called in Lok Sabha Starred questions – questions orally answered by Ministers during Question Hour – are usually followed with supplementary questions from other MPs. However, of the total 440 starred questions admitted this session in the Lok Sabha, only 131 were called in the House. The remaining 309 questions could not be called due to paucity of time. For 44 called questions, the respective MPs were not present in the House. Thus, only 87 were orally answered. On 30 November, only 3 questions were orally answered in the Lok Sabha as MPs who had raised the other 17 were absent. The Question Hour was thus wound up in 25 minutes. The situation was similar in Rajya Sabha - of the total 460 admitted questions, only 18% were orally answered. Recently, the Rajya Sabha amended its rules to ensure that no starred question goes unanswered in the absence of the members who posed them. 48% MPs in Lok Sabha did not participate in any Debate Several major issues were taken up for discussion this session. These included sugarcane pricing, climate change, price rise and the Liberhan report. However, 48% of the members in Lok Sabha did not participate in any debate. Of those who spoke, 25% restricted themselves to 1-2 debates. Only 3% MPs participated in more than 10 debates. A similar pattern existed in Rajya Sabha. 50% MPs did not participate at all and only 1% spoke in more than 10 debates. Notes: This list of Bills does not include Finance and Appropriation Bills The entire analysis is based on detailed data obtained from the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha websites. Data on debates was compiled from the daily Bulletin I supplemented with the actual text of debates as published by the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha secretariats In our analysis, we did not include proposals and responses by Ministers to various issues.

Roadmap for Judicial Reforms

In a country where courts take decades to deliver verdicts, this is sure to sound audacious.

Law minister Veerappa Moily is attempting the unthinkable -- reducing the life of litigation from an average 15 years at present to one year, and that too in just three years from now.

The `Mission Document', which his ministry is preparing to be used as a `roadmap' for judicial reforms, backs up this high-spirited plan with measures like setting up 5,000 new courts across the country that will work in three shifts -- morning, day and evening.

"The infrastructure will remain the same but we will get the work of 15,000 courts to liquidate the 2.74 crore cases, which are pending in trial courts clogging the wheels of justice and entailing a litigant's endless wait for a decision in his case," Moily told TOI in an interview.

To start with, there will be Gram Nyayalays, which will be functional from Gandhi Jayanti on October 2 this year, he said. "In the coming three years, we will set up 5,000 more courts with a clear mandate that from the time of filing of a case till its decision, no more than six months time should be taken," he said and hoped that a substantial percentage of the pendency would be wiped off.

These additional courts will be backed by a solid case management plan that includes clubbing identical cases. Importantly, a judge cannot keep his judgment reserved for a long time.

"While cutting down delay in completing the trial procedure for each case, there will be a time limit put on every judge to deliver his verdict," Moily said, adding, "The time limit for giving judgments after completion of hearing will also be applicable to judges of the High Courts and the Supreme Court."

In making functional the additional 5,000 courts, the services of retired judges will be requisitioned both in the trial courts and the High Courts, which are also reeling under a pendency of nearly 40 lakh cases. A retired district judge, whose services are requisitioned, could expect a fixed pay of Rs 50,000 per month.

"We will train and equip trial court judges, provide them with laptops. Information technology will play a huge role in faster disposal of cases with the help of additional courts," Moily said.

While taking care of procedural delays and providing additional manpower to deal with pendency, the law minister also wants to reduce filing of cases, the government being the biggest litigant in higher courts.

This problem of excessive litigation on behalf of the government has arisen because no officer is ready to stick his neck out for taking a decision not to approach a higher court in the fear of being pulled up later.

"We will evolve a policy to be followed by officers in taking decisions whether or not the government should file an appeal in the higher courts or not. Once the criteria for filing of an appeal is evolved, which would be a little conservative towards moving higher courts, I expect a drastic fall in governmental litigation," the law minister said.

Govt is also planning to requisition the services of retired judges to deal with the pendency of cases. A retired district judge could expect a fixed pay of Rs 50,000 per month.

"We will train and equip trial court judges, provide them with laptops. Information technology will play a huge role in faster disposal of cases with the help of additional courts", law minister Veerappa Moily said. While taking care of procedural delays and providing additional manpower to deal with pendency, the law minister also wants to reduce filing of cases, the government being the biggest litigant in higher courts.

This problem of excessive litigation on behalf of the government has arisen because no officer is ready to stick his neck out for taking a decision not to approach a higher court in the fear of being pulled up later.

Blowing The Whistle - CVC Appointments

-Prashant Bhushan is Advocate, Supreme Court of India, V.K. Shunglu is former Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Arvind Kejriwal is an RTI Activist and Madhu Bhadhuri is former Ambassador, Government of India.

The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) was set up as a department of the government of India in the 1960s. It was functioning as an organization to advise government on all matters relating to corruption in public services and lack of integrity vis-à-vis public servants. Subsequently, in the Hawala case in 1997, the Supreme Court directed that the CBI should be freed from government control and that the CVC will have superintendence over the functioning of the CBI and it will also be granted statutory status so as to make it independent of the government. Thereafter, section 8 1 (a) & (b) of the Central Vigilance Act, 2003 gave supervisory jurisdiction over the CBI to the CVC. It also granted statutory status to the CVC and provided for a procedure for appointment of the members of the CVC by a Committee comprising of the Prime Minister, Home Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha.

Subsequently, in 2005, after the murder of Satyendra Dubey, who had blown the whistle on corruption in NHAI, the Supreme Court directed that the Government put in place either an Act or at least administrative procedures for entertaining complaints of whistle blowers and protecting them from victimization. Consequently, pending legislation on the subject, the government issued an administrative order known as the Public Interest Disclosure and Protection of Informer (PIDPI) resolution by which CVC was empowered to entertain complaints from a whistle blower from any part of the Central government or its Public Sector Undertakings. It also empowered the CVC to get those complaints investigated through any agency of the government and also issue suitable directions to the government for the prosecution of officers. It further empowered the CVC to issue directions to the government for the protection of whistle blowers from victimization and for providing security to those persons.

Through all these processes, the CVC came to be regarded as the main institutional bulwark in this country against corruption. In addition to its original function of advising government on all matters relating to corruption in public services and lack of integrity vis-à-vis public servants, the CVC also acquired the power to supervise the functioning of the CBI in its investigations and also to entertain complaints by whistle blowers and to take suitable action by way of prosecuting corrupt officers found in those cases and protecting the whistle blowers.

Unfortunately, over the last few years, as the following examples and case studies would show, the CVC has failed to live up to the expectations of acting as an institutional bulwark against corruption. In particular, it has failed to appreciate its powers and functions to supervise the functioning of the CBI and its role as an institution to whom whistle blowers could turn for action against corrupt officers or for protection against victimization. What can be seen is the following:

• In a large number of corruption cases by public servants supported by documents sent to the CBI for investigation, the CBI even refused to register an FIR and investigate the matter. Despite repeated written complaints being made to the CVC and requesting the CVC to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction over the CBI to get it to investigate those cases, the CVC has failed to exercise its jurisdiction vested by the CVC Act.
• One example of such a case is the Scorpene Submarine deal case, where the Citizens Forum Against Corruption comprising of a number of highly respected retired government officers, like the former Navy Chief Adml. Tahiliani, former Ambassadors of the Government of India, former Secretaries of the government, etc., wrote to the CBI to investigate the corruption in the Rs.18000 crore Submarine purchase contract in which large amount of evidence and documents were published by Outlook magazine. The CBI refused to register an FIR and the CVC did not direct the CBI to do so, despite it being a case crying for investigation.
• Similarly, in the complaint against former Chief Justice of India, Justice Y.K. Sabharwal, again, despite detailed written complaints to the CBI based on documentary evidence by respectable persons, no FIR was registered nor any investigation made by the CBI. Again the CVC did not use its supervisory jurisdiction over the CBI to get it investigated.
• More recently, in another case involving a telecom licence given to Swan Technologies, there was compelling evidence to suggest that the licence was given for a bribe by transferring shares of the company to benami companies. No FIR was directed to be registered and the CVC merely asked the CVO of the Department of Telecom itself (the very Department against whom complaint had been made) to investigate the same and give a report to the CVC. It may be pointed out that this was a case where a company having an original asset of one crore (to which Reliance had Rs.1000 crore by way of preference shares), was transferred for a few crores to a Mauritius Company with unknown owners just before the licence was granted. With days of the grant of a telecom licence and spectrum, it was sold off to a gulf based company for about 10,000 crores.

All this has defeated the express intention of the Supreme Court on the basis of which this supervisory jurisdiction over the CBI was vested with the CVC.

CVC's role under the whistle blower protection notification

Several hundred complaints under the Whistle Blower Protection Notification have been received by the CVC. Many of these were very serious complaints involving serious acts of corruption by very senior officials in various government departments or Public Sector organizations. However, it appears that in virtually none of those cases, has the CVC recommended any serious action against any senior officers complained against. Not only this, in a large number of cases, the whistle blower was subjected to severe victimization by way of charge sheets, suspensions and transfers. In virtually no case, has the CVC ordered the government departments/PSUs to stop the administrative harassment/victimization of the whistle blower even when it was absolutely clear that the victimization was mala fide and was taking place only on account of the whistle blown by the person. In fact, in some of these cases, the CVC has gone so far as to align itself with the senior officer/government department/PSU against whom the whistle blower had made these complaints. In a case, where a whistle blower has complained against the Chairman of the Central Bank of India, the CVC not only did not take any action against the Chairman nor did it protect the whistle blower from victimization by way of suspension/repeated charge sheeting/transfer, etc., but went further to ask the Central Bank to engage a common lawyer to defend the CVC in the petition filed by the whistle blower in the High Court.

The pattern which emerges regarding the manner in which the CVC dealt with the whistle blowers is as follows:

In the beginning, the entire attention of the CVC was focused on routinely protecting the identity of the whistle blower and not processing the complaints further by investigating the charges, etc. Later, the manner in which the complaints were processed was to send them to the CVO of the same department against whom the complaint had been made, which in turn sends the complaint to the person against whom the complaint was made for his response. Usually, on the response of the officer against whom the complaint had been made, the complaint was closed without even referring the response to the whistle blower for pointing out any misleading or false information given by the complained in his defence. Usually, the CVOs of the various departments are officers within the same department who are working under more senior officers in that department and their ACRs are also written by these senior officers. It is, therefore, unrealistic to expect these CVOs to find fault with their bosses who would be writing their ACRs. However, despite this, this kind of routine procedure has been adopted by the CVC to get white-washing reports from the CVOs and close the complaints on that basis without any independent investigation and without even referring the response back to the whistle blower.

The whistleblowers have usually been victimized by their bosses against whom the complaints were made, usually by way of departmental chargesheets and transfers. No action has been taken by the CVC to protect them from such victimization on the basis that taking departmental action against the employees is the prerogative of the department. This attitude has rendered the power given to the CVC by the whistleblower notification into a dead letter.As a result of inaction on the part of the CVC, the whistle blower complaints have been coming down.

No of Whistle Blower complaints received by the CVC

• In 2006- 338
• In 2007- 328
• In 2008- 276

It is clear that the CVC has failed to live up to the expectations of it functioning as an institutional bulwark against corruption. The reasons appear to be that by and large persons being appointed as Vigilance Commissioners are former bureaucrats from various ministries and departments. Unfortunately, it appears that despite the statutory status given to the CVC to enable it act independently of the government, most of these members have not been able to outgrow their bureaucratic servility to their political masters. Perhaps, the problem also lies in the choice of the bureaucrats chosen to become members of the CVC. It appears and stands to reason that neither the present government nor the leader of the opposition (who is an important member of the previous government and aspiring to become a member of the future government) are interested in having a CVC which will function as a true watchdog or bulwark against corruption. Since the leaders of the present government or the previous government or their colleagues would be the subject matter of investigations and prosecution for corruption, if the CVC were to fulfill the role assigned to it and expected of it by the Supreme Court, it appears that they want a servile and submissive officer as Vigilance Commissioner who would deal with corruption cases in a routine manner and not as a vigilant and aggressive watchdog against corruption. In fact, similar problem has cropped up in the appointment of other statutory authorities like NHRC.

Today, when the government is in the process of drafting a Whistle Blower Act, perhaps the time has come to revisit the method of appointment of members of the CVC and the transparency and methodology of these appointments. The time has perhaps come to put in place a mechanism to free such appointments from the influence of those persons who are likely to be the subject matter of the anti-corruption exercise of the CVC and also put in place a system of selection which guarantees transparency and some degree of public participation.

The Khaki must shine

-Prakash Singh.

The Police organisation in India in its present form is based, essentially, on the Police Act of 1861, which was specifically designed to raise a police which would be “politically more useful.” It constituted a single homogeneous force of civil constabulary for the entire country to perform duties which could not be assigned to the military arm.

The Indian Police Commission of 1902-03, which reviewed the working of the police, found that “the police force throughout the country is in a most unsatisfactory condition, that abuses are common everywhere, that this involves great injury to the people and discredit to the government, and that radical reforms are urgently necessary.” This was the first time that a responsible body talked of police reforms. Ironically, the battle for reforms continues even after more than a hundred years.

At the dawn of Independence, the political masters could have restructured the police and made it accountable to the people. The transformation was unfortunately not carried out. As years passed, every successive government found it convenient to use, misuse and abuse the police for its partisan political ends. In 1977, the government appointed the National Police Commission (NPC) as it felt that “far reaching changes have taken place in the country” since independence but “there has been no comprehensive review of the police system after independence despite radical changes in the political, social and economic situation in the country.” The NPC submitted eight detailed reports between 1979 and 1981, containing comprehensive recommendations covering the entire gamut of police working.

The government’s response to the core recommendations of the NPC was, unfortunately, negative. In 1983, when the reports were forwarded to the State Governments, they were asked merely to take appropriate follow-up action. The hint was more than obvious and it was not surprising therefore that the state governments conveniently put the major recommendations of the NPC in cold storage.

These recommendations of the NPC were subsequently resurrected in a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) before the Supreme Court in 1996. At the time the petition was filed, the Supreme Court’s attention was drawn, among other things, to two major tragedies which had overtaken the Republic due to the failure of the police to uphold the rule of law: the Delhi riots of 1984 and the demolition of the disputed shrine at Ayodhya in 1992. The Justice Nanavati Commission, which inquired into the 1984 riots, recommended that “there should be an independent police force which should be free from the political influence and which is well equipped to take immediate and effective action.” The Liberhan Commission report on Ayodhya is yet to be made public.

During the pendency of the petition, another tragedy befell the country—the Gujarat Riots in 2002 when the police acted in a partisan manner. The National Human Rights Commission, which inquired into the incidents, urged “that the matter of police reform receive attention at the highest political level, at the Centre and in the States, and that this issue be pursued in good faith, and on a sustained basis with the greater interest of the country alone in mind.”

It is significant that while the PIL was progressing in the Supreme Court, three Committees were appointed by the government at different periods of time to deliberate over the question of police reforms: the Ribeiro Committee in 1998, the Padmanabhaiah Committee in 2000 and the Malimath Committee on criminal justice system in 2002. All three committees broadly came to the same conclusions and emphasised the urgent need for police reforms in the context of newly emerging challenges. However, the much needed reforms were never carried out because of the combined opposition of the political parties.

The dilemma before the Supreme Court was whether it should wait further for the governments to take suitable steps for police reforms. However, as recorded in the judgement, “having regard to (i) the gravity of the problem; (ii) the urgent need for preservation and strengthening of Rule of Law; (iii) pendency of even this petition for last over ten years; (iv) the fact that various Commissions and Committees have made recommendations on similar lines for introducing reforms in the police set up in the country; and (v) total uncertainty as to when police reforms would be introduced, we think that there cannot be any further wait, and the stage has come for issue of appropriate directions for immediate compliance so as to be operative till such time a new model Police Act is prepared by the Central Government and/or the State Governments pass the requisite legislations.”

In a landmark judgement on September 22, 2006 the Supreme Court demolished in one stroke the colonial police structure that hobbled India for over 145 years. It ordered the setting up of three institutions at the state level with a view to insulating the police from extraneous influences, giving it functional autonomy and ensuring its accountability. These institutions are:

• State Security Commission which would lay down the broad policies and give directions for the performance of the preventive tasks and service oriented functions of the police;
• Police Establishment Board comprising the Director General of Police and four other senior officers of the Department which shall decide all transfers, postings, promotions and other service related matters of officers of and below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police and make appropriate recommendations regarding the postings and transfers of officers of the rank of Superintendent of Police and above to the state government; and
• Police Complaints Authority at the district and state levels with a view to inquiring into allegations of misconduct by the police personnel.

Besides, the Court ordered that the Director-General of Police shall be selected by the state government from amongst the three senior-most officers of the department who have been empanelled for promotion to that rank by the Union Public Service Commission, and that the appointee shall have a prescribed minimum tenure of two years. Police officers on operational duties in the field like the inspector-general in charge of a zone, deputy inspector-general in charge of a range, superintendent in charge of a district and station house officer in charge of a police station would also have a minimum tenure of two years. The Court also ordered the separation of investigating police from the law and order police to ensure speedier investigation, better expertise and improved rapport with the people.

The Union government was also asked to set up a National Security Commission for the selection and placement of heads of central police organisations, upgrading the effectiveness of these forces and improving the service conditions of its personnel.

The Soli Sorabjee Committee drafted and submitted a Model Police Act to the central government on October 30, 2006. The Model Police Act conformed to the fundamental principles enunciated by the Supreme Court, though there are slight differences in nomenclature and in details.

The Supreme Court orders and Sorabjee Committee recommendations have the potential to transform the police and change its working philosophy. The transition is however encountering strong opposition from the political leadership and the bureaucracy. Ten states have satisfactorily complied with the directions of the Supreme Court, but the majority of states are dragging their feet. Some states have enacted laws with a view to circumventing the implementation of Supreme Court’s directions. Unfortunately, there is total absence of public consultation on the subject.

The reforms, it needs to be understood, are not for the glory of the police—they are to give better security and protection to the people of the country, uphold their human rights and generally improve governance.

The Supreme Court has meanwhile constituted a monitoring committee to oversee the implementation of its directions in the various states. It is obvious that unless the judiciary cracks the whip and makes an example of one or two non-compliant states, the much needed reforms would remain only as an aspiration. Unfortunately, the monitoring committee is working at a slow place and seems averse to making any stringent recommendation to the Supreme Court. Public opinion must press the executive and the judiciary to accelerate the process of police reforms. The media should also contribute to this effort.

The stakes are very high. The challenges on the law and order front are getting more complex with every passing day. Organised crime is spreading its tentacles. Naxalites pose a formidable challenge. The terrorist threat is extremely serious and has the potential to destabilise the country. We cannot face the formidable challenges of the present times with a police force which was raised to meet the challenges of a colonial past. Our first line of defence has to be strengthened and its capabilities augmented. There is no room for further delay.

India Fatalities

India Fatalities, 2009

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists	Total
Jammu & Kashmir	30	30	112	172
Assam	104	19	108	231
Manipur	45	6	213	264
Meghalaya	0	0	3	3
Mizoram	0	0	0	0
Nagaland	3	0	5	8
Tripura	0	0	1	1
Uttar Pradesh	0	0	2	2
West Bengal	2	0	0	2
Left-wing Extremism	138	209	138	485
Total*	322	264	582	1168

*Data till June 26, 2009

India Fatalities, 2008

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists	Total
Jammu & Kashmir	69	90	382	541
Assam	224	16	133	373
Delhi	27	1	2	30
Gujarat	57	0	0	57
Haryana	0	0	1	1
Maharashtra	171	20	9	200
Karnataka	0	0	2	2
Manipur	131	13	348	492
Meghalaya	0	1	11	12
Mizoram	0	4	1	5
Nagaland	42	2	101	145
Rajasthan	80	0	0	80
Tripura	7	4	16	27
Left-wing Extremism	210	214	214	638
Uttar Pradesh	1	7	0	8
Total	1019	372	1220	2611

India Fatalities, 2007

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists	Total
Jammu & Kashmir	164	121	492	777
Andhra Pradesh	55	0	0	55
Arunachal Pradesh	0	0	12	12
Assam	269	19	149	437
Manipur	150	40	218	408
Meghalaya	4	1	13	18
Nagaland	20	0	88	108
Punjab	7	0	0	7
Rajasthan	2	0	0	2
Tripura	10	5	21	36
Left-wing Extremism	240	218	192	650
Haryana	68	0	0	68
Tamil Nadu	5	0	0	5
Uttar Pradesh	15	0	0	15
Total	1009	404	1185	2598

India Fatalities, 2006

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists	Total
Jammu & Kashmir	349	168	599	1116
Assam	96	35	43	174
Manipur	95	37	148	280
Meghalaya	7	0	17	24
Nagaland	9	1	80	90
Tripura	11	19	29	59
Left-wing Extremism	266	128	348	742
Uttar Pradesh	21	0	1	22
Gujarat	0	0	4	4
Maharashtra	240	0	4	244
West Bengal	10	0	0	10
Total	1104	388	1273	2765

1994-2005
(Data does not include fatalities in left-wing extremism)

Year	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists	Total
1994	1696	417	1919	4032
1995	1779	493	1603	3875
1996	2084	615	1482	4181
1997	1740	641	1734	4115
1998	1819	526	1419	3764
1999	1377	763	1614	3754
2000	1803	788	2384	4975
2001	1693	721	3425	5839
2002	1174	623	2176	3973
2003	1187	420	2095	3702
2004	886	434	1322	2642
2005	913	287	1319	2519
Total	18151	6728	22492	47371

*The figures are calculated from the following regions

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists	Total
Jammu & Kashmir	10483	4736	17458	32677
Northeast	7287	1978	4930	14195
Punjab	82	2	91	175
Others	299	12	13	324
Total	18151	6728	22492	47371

NATIONAL ID SCHEME: Your identification, Please.

-Ashwin Mahesh

co-founder and editor at India Together

The Centre has decided, not for the first time, that all Indians should have a Unique Identification Number. The idea itself has been floating around for a few years, with even a few pilots launched here and there, mostly to no avail. This time, however, unlike in the past the government appears to be serious, and has appointed one of the leading advocates of the plan, former Infosys CEO Nandan Nilekani to head the Unique Identification Authority of India, created earlier this year.

Nandan has thought of the need for a national ID system for as long as anyone else, and given his combination of professional expertise and personal interest in this exercise, he is a powerful and practical choice to take up this task. And in giving him this role, the government too has acted well, preferring the specific technology-driven objective of the UIDAI to some other responsibilities. As a member of the Planning Commission or at the helm of the Ministry of Human Resource Development, just to cite two other jobs linked to his name, the difficulties would have been greater (the PC is losing its relevance, and MHRD is a regulatory mine-field better left to a career politician than a techno-manager).

The corporate world has been particularly hearty in cheering Nilekani's appointment, seeing this as new direction in which 'skill' and 'management techniques' may at last be starting to be welcomed in governance too. I think it is hasty to read any such intent for the moment; instead we must see this appointment more as a continuation of an existing trend, analagous to (but of lesser significance) than the earlier selection of Montek Singh Ahluwalia and the Prime Minister himself for their offices. Nandan may simply be the 'man for the job' within the terms of the political walls that now exist.

The 'need' for an 'identifier'

The most powerful arguments for the Multi-purpose National Identity Card (MNIC) have relied on the principle of necessity. Somewhat simplistically, there is a tendency to think that 'developed' economies are those with robust identification systems, and peg the national ID to this kind of thinking. Secondly, it is argued that ID systems are needed to curb the excessive waste and pilferage that is now standard in all our expenditure programs (the UIDAI has an explicit focus on curbing the losses in vast Centrally-funded programs). But there are good reasons not to get carried away by this rhetoric.

• There are some very developed countries that do not use a national ID card - Wikipedia currently lists Australia, Denmark, Ireland, Japan and the UK among countries without a national identification scheme. Australia recently even shelved its plans to create one, in the face of opposition. And the American Social Security Number, which is the most commonly cited example of the kind of system we 'need', is not really a system for the 'identification' of individuals, although it is used in that way by certain sections of American society (see box).

• Cleaning up big-ticket Central schemes is clearly a welcome goal. But there is no need to mix this up with the focus of the national ID program. The merit of an objective is not the same as the merit of the effort/method to achieve it. Failures in the delivery of public service delivery may be tackled partially by the creation of identity systems, but this is not necessarily the only or best way to do it. Many services already have their own IDs, in fact - this is the clearest evidence that their poor performance is not due to a lack of ID systems or technology, but a broader failure of governance.

• Linking the ID to benefits under any of the ongoing programs is a risk. Practically speaking, the benefits cannot be linked to the ID itself, since (to begin with, and for some years) most of the beneficiaries of various programs will not have completed the identification process. This means, inevitably, that we will have a certain period during which benefits will have to be delivered to those without IDs, or denied to those unable to establish IDs at the point of service. Indeed, these are problems that already exist for most programs, and saddling the UIDAI with resolving these is a mistake.

Let us also not forget another important reality. An ID only makes sense if it reveals something about the person whose identity it contains. Usually, this will include some personal details (age, sex, date of birth, caste, religion, and so on - some of these are particularly needed for programs where benefits are linked to one or more of these pieces of data) but it is not not clear that people want to be identified clearly in all cases. In India, identity is already a potent issue, and the cause of endless ethnic and religious conflict - a system to improve identification, therefore, will inevitably raise concerns over potential abuse. And our politics, which is essentially defensive, isn't ready to deal with this.

In the US, Social Security numbers were introduced for a pension program based on employer contributions, and were not intended for broad ID purposes. And despite this limited focus, it took five years for the program to get off the ground. Even today many agencies of the US government and the states do not use it to establish identity at the point of delivering services or benefits • E isn't everything • Interview with Nandan Nilekani • Book Review: Imagining India

An additional difficulty, in the case of the UIDAI, is the expectation that it should deliver something within two or three years. This may be too much to expect, given that much of the 'implementation' would need to negotiate its way past the countless array of programs that the Centre and the States have, each with its own well-guarded administrative and political turf. In the optimism over Nandan's appointment to the UIDAI, we should not forget the complexity of the challenge ahead.

Fixing the goal posts

Given all this, what are the options before the UIDAI? The Government has already put its foot into its mouth, by linking the Authority to the specific goal of reducing irregularities in its flagship social welfare programmes. Therefore, this is not a focus the UIDAI can withdraw from. The best alternative would be to puruse a few other objectives which are critical, and and hope that favourable outcomes on these other fronts can be leveraged to overcome obstacles to the stated goal of cleaning up Bharat Nirman or the NREGS.

• Distribute, distribute, distribute!
  First, the Authority must decouple the goal of getting people identified from the question of how these IDs will be used. The distribution of IDs is an idependent goal, and should not be linked to questions about where they will be used, or even what they will reveal about those being identified. If this view is embraced, then a program of rapid ID distribution can be taken up.

  Anyone who wants an ID should be given one with minimum fuss, as long as any other government-issued ID is provided as documentary evidence. The Authority should launch an all-out effort to distribute as many IDs as possible through as many channels as available, so that numerous touch-points for getting hold of an ID are accessible to citizens. Once IDs are issued, it can embrace the techniques of the internet era, allowing citizens to 'crowd-source in' their documents to link these to the IDs they are assigned. Large institutions, with tens of thousands of employees, can also be roped in to facilitate distribution of IDs to their people, in controlled environments. It is also likely that as large government organisations are roped in to faciliate, some of them are likely to figure out ways to start linking their own employee and benefits documentation to these IDs, for their own effectiveness.

  Still, and inevitably, this will raise some cynicism that the ID is a Trishanku object, floating around in a universe of non-use. This has to be addressed, but it must not be allowed to derail the distribution of the IDs themselves.

• Acceptable proof of identity
  Secondly, the UIDAI must launch a parallel effort to get as many institutions as possible to accept the identification it issues as proof of one's identity. There is no shortage of use cases for this - post offices, banks, the tens of thousands of security check points everywhere in the country, trains and airlines, and many others should be encouraged to accept the Unique ID as a substitute for the current forms of identification they now accept. Campaigns of advertising encouraging people to 'leave your PAN card safe at home, use UID to prove who you are' should be all over the place. Indeed, the Rs.100 crores set aside for this project is most needed to communicate the program, rather than actually initiate it.

• Linking with schemes and programs
  Whatever the gains on the above two counts, the UIDAI will have to deliver at least partially on its stated goal of making government programs work well. Here, what the Authority needs more than anything else is a working arrangement with a few states that ensures implementation of the proposed vision. A tightly coupled program which ensures that the IDs, once issued by the Authority, are seamlessly introduced into a few government schemes at the state-level, is needed. Karnataka is a good bet, since Nilekani himself heads the e-governance effort there, and Karnataka is already among the leading states when it comes to computerised administration.

The National ID certainly has the potential to transform the delivery of public services in important ways. But this is not necessarily its biggest benefit. The real value of such programs is to create a backbone upon which governance and economic development rest comfortably. The ID should be a catalyst for such change, rather than merely a tool for authentication or auditing government schemes. This is all the more important because there has been no proper debate on the need for the ID scheme, and consequently no preparation for the very real pitfalls that lie ahead.

Lives sacrificed: Women and health in South Asia

By Deepti Priya Mehrotra

A new World Bank report looks at the state of reproductive health of poor women in five countries -- Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka -- and makes a case for decentralised planning, delivery and expansion of health services, with a clear focus on enhancing inclusion

‘Sparing Lives: Better Reproductive Health for Poor Women in South Asia’, by Meera Chatterjee, Ruth Levine, Nirmala Murthy and Shreelata Rao-Seshadri, the World Bank, MacMillan, 2008

This World Bank report, released on March 5, 2009, investigates the state of reproductive health of poor women in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. It also makes a case for increasingly decentralised planning, delivery and expansion of health services, with a clear focus on enhancing inclusion.

The report highlights a number of significant concerns. Sri Lanka, despite ongoing conflict, fares remarkably better than the other four countries in terms of maternal mortality, pregnancy and delivery care, infant weight and death rates, contraceptive acceptance and fertility rates. This is attributable to a high commitment to health on the part of successive governments. With decentralised planning the cornerstone of health delivery, services are provided at all levels, as an integrated package. The report notes that Sri Lanka’s relative success is “not because it spends more per capita, but because it uses resources more efficiently and equitably… Low unit costs in Sri Lanka contribute to high reproductive health access…”

Gopalakrishnan, a representative from the prime minister’s office, India, noted that the findings of the report are “disconcerting”; he reiterated the “urgency of concerns” to be addressed. Enormous disparities exist in India throughout the realm of maternal health and services delivery. For instance, while some antenatal care and tetanus toxoid reached 77-78% of women in 2005-06, only half of the poorest women received care as compared to the richest. Scheduled caste and scheduled tribe women have far lower maternal health service coverage levels than other women. While overall fertility reduction and contraceptive use have improved, the improvement is not as much as is desired. Between 1998-99 and 2005-06, fertility declined from 2.8 to 2.7 births per woman, the greatest change occurring among 15-19-year-olds. Kerala, Goa, Tamil Nadu, Himachal Pradesh and Punjab have achieved replacement-level fertility, while Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Orissa will contribute over 50% of the country’s increase in population over the coming decade. As for contraceptive use, only 48.5% of couples used modern methods of contraception (in 2005-06), one-fifth of these being temporary methods. Terminal methods, ie sterilisation, continue to be dominant. The average age for female sterilisation is amongst the lowest in the world (below 25 years). The poorest women in India are four times more likely than the richest women to have an ‘unmet need’ for contraception, underlining the urgency of ensuring wider access to temporary contraceptive methods. The gap between the poor and the rich in contraceptive use is much less in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, as compared to India, Nepal and Pakistan.

The average risk of maternal death in these five South Asian countries (1 in 43) is almost a hundred times greater than that of a woman in the industrialised countries (1 in 4,000). Maternal mortality rates in India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan are still two to four times higher than the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set for 2015. While the lifetime risk of dying during pregnancy for a woman in Sri Lanka is 1 in 430, in Bangladesh it is 1 in 59, in India 1 in 48, in Pakistan 1 in 31, and in Nepal 1 in 24. India needs to reduce its maternal mortality rate by two-thirds to meet the MDG -- from the current estimate of 301 to 100 (by the year 2015).

Malnutrition contributes to maternal mortality, and infant and child deaths. Over two-fifths of all children under five in the region are malnourished, the figure even in Sri Lanka being as high as 22%. While 34.3% of women are acutely undernourished in Bangladesh, in India nearly half (47%) of mothers aged 15-19 years are undernourished. Compared to the richest quintile of urban women in India, the poorest urban quintile is 4.8 times more likely to be undernourished, and the poorest rural quintile, 5.6 times more likely. Over 45% of rural children under five years of age are undernourished, and almost one-third of urban children: a total of about 50 million undernourished young children in India.

The five countries together have a huge population of poor people: approximately 500 million. About four-fifths of the population of Bangladesh, India and Nepal live on less than 2 dollars a day, and two-fifths in Sri Lanka. Governments are certainly not directing sufficient resources into reproductive health services for the poor. Integrated health services and nutrition are critically needed and ought to be very high on the priority agendas of all the nations. Noting that poverty and poor reproductive health form a vicious cycle, the report emphasises the need for a renewed focus on adolescent health and nutrition, and accessible contraception, pregnancy and childbirth services. It also acknowledges that gender discrimination exists in society as well as in the health services sector, and that needs to be tackled.

While the report provides useful information on poor women’s reproductive health, it does not attempt correlations with macro factors like food security, unemployment, access to potable water, political participation and so on. Such correlations are needed, to arrive at a more comprehensive analysis of causes and policy implications. Several elements required to help South Asian poor women to climb out of the abyss may still be missing from the jigsaw.

During the video conference at the simultaneous release of the report in the five countries, Dr Mohammad Abdul Qayyum, director general of family planning, Bangladesh, gave voice to a woman-friendly policy understanding: “We want to provide and strengthen safe birth practices wherever the woman wants to be.” He noted that maximum births could take place at home, and spelt out Bangladesh’s commitment to community clinics, where referrals for high-risk and emergency services could be made available. Indu Capoor, a women’s health professional and director, CHETNA (Centre for Holistic Education, Training and Nutrition Awareness, Ahmedabad) pointed out that rejection of home births and traditional birth attendants, to be replaced wholesale by institutional births and ‘trained’ attendants, is a deeply flawed and highly questionable policy for South Asian countries. Pakistan, India and Nepal would do well to heed the practical wisdom inherent in Bangladesh’s policy choice. This debate highlights the need for policymakers to listen far more to grassroots health activists who may have different points of view on how to handle issues. As Gouri Choudhury, director, Action India, remarked: “We have been saying much of this for the past 20 years. What is new?… The health volunteers appointed by the government are called ASHA now, but they are still underpaid and overburdened… This is not decentralised service delivery!”